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Abstract 
Using a national sample, this study experimentally tests the effects of news visuals and texts 
that emphasize either the causes and impacts of climate change or actions that can be taken to 
address climate change. We test the effects of variations in text and imagery on discrete 
emotions (i.e., hope, fear, and anger) and, indirectly, on support for climate mitigation 
policies. Political ideology is examined as a moderator. The findings indicate that news 
images and texts that focus on climate-oriented actions can increase hope and, in the case of 
texts, decrease fear and anger, and these effects generally hold across the ideological 
spectrum. In turn, the influence of emotions on policy support depends on ideology: Hope 
and fear increase support for climate policies for all ideological groups but particularly 
conservatives, whereas anger polarizes the opinions of liberals and conservatives. 
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Scientists widely agree that climate change is real, human-caused, and requires a 
dramatic reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in order to minimize dangerous ecological 
and societal impacts. [1] In 2016, the World Economic Forum identified a failure of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation as the global risk with the greatest damage potential [2]. 
Although a majority of Americans express at least moderate support for government policies 
to mitigate climate change, such as regulating carbon emissions and funding renewables, [3] 
Americans‟ concern for climate change and the political priority they grant it are relatively 
low. [4-5] There also are wide ideological gaps in public attitudes toward emissions-
reduction policies, particularly those involving new regulations – which liberals tend to 
support and conservatives are more likely to oppose. [6] Public support for regulation will be 
a key factor in motivating elected officials to act more decisively to reduce the risk of climate 
change. [7]  
Americans‟ relatively low political prioritization of and concern about climate change 
may stem, in part, from their lack of emotional involvement with the issue. In particular, 
hope, which prior research has shown is positively related to climate policy support and 
activism, [8-9] is often thought to be in short supply among Americans when it comes to 
climate change. [10] News stories about climate change tend to emphasize dramatic, 
threatening consequences, while sending a muddled message about possible actions that can 
mitigate its effects. [11-14] Given that media are the public‟s primary sources of information 
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turn, undermine engagement with the issue. [8] At the same time, even while news coverage 
of climate change emphasizes dramatic impacts, it often does so in a way that distances the 
public from the problem and its solutions, for example by focusing on non-human nature and 
remote geographies. [17] This may impede the arousal of negative emotions that are 
productive for public engagement. [18-19]  
Can communicating about a risk – in this case, climate change – in terms of its 
potential solutions, rather than its impacts or causes, differentially affect citizens‟ emotions 
and support for policies to mitigate that risk? In the present study, we integrate literature from 
risk communication, political science, and media effects to inform an online survey-
experiment with a national sample that tests the influence of news visuals and texts that 
emphasize either the causes and impacts of climate change or actions that can be taken to 
address climate change. We test both the main and interactive effects of variations in text and 
imagery on the discrete emotions of hope, fear, and anger, and, indirectly, on support for 
climate mitigation policies. Recognizing the stark ideological divides in public opinion about 
climate change, [20] we also build on theories of motivated reasoning and affective 
intelligence to examine political ideology as a moderator of these effects. Of particular 
interest is whether certain imagery and textual variations and, in turn, the emotional 
responses induced by these treatments, may help ameliorate the persistent and growing 
ideological polarization on the issue.  
Despite our increasingly multimodal media environment, we know very little about 
how images augment and interact with news texts about risk issues to influence key outcomes 
such as emotions and policy support. [21] By addressing this research gap, the present study 
provides a more complete understanding of how media coverage of climate change may 
affect audiences. Moreover, knowledge of how text, imagery, and ideology interact in their 
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to effectively engage citizens from across the ideological spectrum with controversial risks 
like climate change, while also contributing to our theoretical understanding of media effects 
and the antecedents of public opinion in the context of risk-related issues. Ultimately, we find 
that action-oriented imagery and text can help increase hope, whereas impacts-oriented 
information is more evocative of fear and anger. Further, we find that emotional reactions to 
media content drive public opinion about climate policies but that the implications of this 
effect for ideological polarization depend on the emotion: Media-induced hope and especially 
fear can help reconcile opinion gulfs between liberals and conservatives, whereas anger is 
polarizing.  
1.1 The Influence of News Text and Imagery on Emotions  
Emotions are psychological responses of varying strength and duration that are 
evoked in response to an external stimulus. [22] Fear, anger, and hope are discrete emotions, 
in that they have “unique appraisal patterns, motivational functions, and behavioral 
associations.” [22, p. 290] However, all three represent reactions to an external threat, a 
commonality that makes them particularly relevant to study in the context of a risk like 
climate change. Lazarus, [23-24] in his comprehensive theory of discrete emotions, defines 
emotions in terms of their “core relational theme.” For anger, this is “a demeaning offense 
against me and mine;” for fear, “confronting an immediate, concrete, and overwhelming 
physical danger” and for hope, “fearing the worst but yearning for better and believing the 
wished-for improvement is possible.” [24, p. 16]  
Changes in message content, including news stories, can induce discrete emotions. 
[25-29] News stories influence audiences‟ emotions by altering their interpretations of an 
issue or event. [27, 30] News visuals are considered particularly potent for engaging audience 
emotions, [31-32] in part because visuals are processed quickly and intuitively, thereby 
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provide a salient entry point to a news story. [34-35] Moreover, individuals see images as 
highly credible and often take them as veridical representations of reality, [31, 36] which may 
promote an emotional connection with an image‟s subject.  
Studies show that visual imagery in news stories can evoke negative emotions, 
including fear and anger, above and beyond any effect of the text. [21, 29, 37] These studies 
mostly have been conducted in the context of war and conflict. In particular, images that 
depict danger, such as an image of terrorism victims, evoke fear, whereas images that depict 
an injustice and especially those that identify a perpetrator responsible for the suffering elicit 
anger. [30] To our knowledge, the effects of news visuals on hope have not previously been 
studied experimentally, which is consistent with the dearth of research on discrete positive 
emotions overall. [22]  
1.2 The Effects of Climate Change Visuals and Texts on Emotions 
What types of climate change news visuals and texts are likely to influence 
individuals‟ emotions? Past studies point to key content dimensions along which emotions 
may shift – namely, based on the extent to which news messages portray the causes, impacts, 
or mitigative actions associated with climate change. [18-19, 38] Because messages that 
stress climate change‟s causes and/or impacts often do so by portraying a clear threat – either 
in terms of a danger, injustice, or both – they are apt to elicit fear and anger while minimizing 
hope. In contrast, messages that focus on actions that can address the danger or injustice 
posed by climate change offer the promise of a desired outcome and are thereby likely to 
evoke hope while reducing fear and anger. 
Scholars have used Q-sort methods to explore how individuals orient to climate 
change imagery. [19, 38] In these studies, participants were asked to rank climate images on 
dimensions of salience and efficacy. Across studies, images of climate impacts, particularly 
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climate change is important. Smokestack images, which connote climate pollution, also 
promoted salience. These same images, however, were ranked lowest when it came to self-
efficacy, or individuals‟ sense that they can do something about climate change. Rather, 
images of actions that can be taken to mitigate climate change – especially images of energy 
futures such as solar panels and, to a lesser extent, of lifestyle choices such as political protest 
– were seen as most empowering. Although these studies did not explicitly measure discrete 
emotional responses, such responses are implicit in the data; when asked to reflect on the 
results, participants noted that impact imagery made them feel powerless, overwhelmed, and 
scared. [38] Reactions to smokestack images were characterized by feelings of disgust and 
distress levelled at industry and government, while participants associated action-oriented 
images with positive feelings and the possibility for personal change. In a more direct 
exploration of affective responses, Leviston et al. [18] interviewed Australians in a series of 
workshops and asked them to categorize their emotional reactions to various climate images. 
They found that images of natural disasters and extreme weather (e.g., flooding), as well as 
climate pollution (e.g., smokestacks), evoked negative emotions like fear and anger, whereas 
images of climate solutions (e.g., solar panels) aroused positive emotions (also see [39]).  
Although informative, the aforementioned research relies on small, non-generalizable 
samples and captures emotional responses through interviews with participants; it does not 
necessarily tell us what effects variations in visual climate change communication will have 
on audience emotions, or whether these emotions can, in turn, activate support for climate 
mitigation policy. Thus, the current study builds on this past research to experimentally test 
the effects of four types of climate images found to elicit the strongest and most consistent 
reactions from participants: they were associated with either a sense of helplessness, fear, and 
anger (i.e., aerial flood view, smokestacks) or a sense of empowerment and hope (solar 
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story that includes an image of either flooding or polluting smokestacks will increase fear and 
anger but decrease hope, whereas a news story that includes an image of climate-focused 
actions (i.e., solar panels or political protest) will decrease fear and anger but increase hope 
(Hypothesis 1). 
Several studies have examined how textual information about climate-related impacts 
and actions influence emotions. One experimental study found that news stories that 
discussed actions to address the negative consequences of climate change increased hope and 
lessened fear, relative to a story that only discussed the negative consequences. [8] Another 
experiment found that a message that emphasized the possibility of individual action to 
improve the climate increased hope. [40] Survey research has further demonstrated that 
stories about climate impacts elicit higher fear and anger ratings than stories about climate 
solutions. [39] Thus, we expect that relative to a news text that only discusses the impacts of 
climate change, a news text that discusses either impacts along with actions to address 
climate change or actions alone will decrease fear and anger but increase hope (Hypothesis 
2). 
1.3 The Interaction between Text and Images 
Recently, scholars have stressed the importance of analyzing the effects of visuals in 
interaction with news texts rather than in isolation, [21, 41-42] which is an additional aim of 
the present study. Past research suggests that presenting media messages via both text and 
pictures improves learning and memory, [33, 43-44] particularly when the image and text 
have congruent or reinforcing meanings. [45-46] Congruent messages benefit from the 
elevated salience, richness, and memorability of visuals as well as the logical structure of the 
text. [42] In other words, the image and text work together, producing a greater effect on 
audiences than either alone. However, visual and textual information in climate change news 
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respond when the image and text are incongruent. [42] On one hand, the image may 
overwhelm the accompanying text [32, 48], given individuals‟ superior recall for visuals over 
text. [33] On the other hand, the image may help attract attention to the text, [44] but the 
syntactical structure of the text will exert the prevailing influence. [21, 48] Most prior 
research examining the multimodal influence of images and text has analyzed effects on 
information recall [43] or, occasionally, issue perceptions, [48] and very few studies have 
manipulated both textual and image content simultaneously. However, one recent study [21] 
examined the effects of varying both image and textual news content on emotional reactions, 
finding that images but not text influenced emotions, with no interaction between text and 
imagery. In other words, the influence of image content occurred regardless of the 
congruence or incongruence of the text.  
Given the mixed empirical findings, our hypothesis is more tentative in this area; 
however, we expect an interaction between imagery and text, such that the predicted effects 
of the news text on fear, anger, and hope will be weakened in the presence of contradictory 
imagery (e.g., a news story about impacts with action imagery) and strengthened in the 
presence of reinforcing imagery (e.g., a news story about impacts with impact imagery) 
(Hypothesis 3).  
1.4 The Moderating Role of Ideology 
U.S. public opinion about climate change is divided along ideological lines, with 
liberals and – to a lesser extent – moderates more concerned about climate change and 
supportive of policies to address it than conservatives. [6, 20] In turn, liberals and 
conservatives often exhibit divergent responses to information about climate change. [49] 
This results from motivated reasoning, whereby people with strong ideological commitments 
actively counter-argue and/or defensively avoid information that contradicts their beliefs 
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individuals‟ emotional reactions to a news article vary according to their political ideology. 
[51] Although most research on motivated reasoning concerns responses to textual 
information, prior studies indicate that how individuals attend to, interpret, and react to 
images also is contingent on their existing predispositions. [52] Gadarian [53] found that 
images lose their potency in a polarized political climate and particularly when the image 
itself is attached to a particular political party‟s policies. In such cases, an image will be 
emotionally evocative or persuasive only among those who share an identity with the party 
associated with the image. Thus, to the extent that climate change is considered a liberal 
issue, related images may be dismissed by conservatives – although this moderating effect 
may be minimized somewhat when the image is presented by a non-partisan news source 
rather than for political purposes. [53]  
Accordingly, we hypothesize interactions between the text manipulation and ideology 
(Hypothesis 4) and between the imagery manipulation and ideology (Hypothesis 5), such that 
the respective treatment effects on emotions will be weaker among conservatives relative to 
liberals and moderates. This is because both liberals and moderates are more accepting of 
climate change and thus likely to be more open to information about climate change than 
conservatives. However, given that images are generally considered more emotionally 
arousing than text [31] and, even when potentially polarizing, retain their influence regardless 
of individuals‟ political orientations as long as the images are not sponsored by a political 
party, [53] we expect that the interaction will be weaker for imagery than for text.  
1.5 The Effect of Emotions on Policy Support  
 Emotional reactions to news content are important because of their potential effects 
on public opinion. [26, 30] For example, in their Affective Intelligence Theory, Marcus et al. 
[54] argue that citizens‟ emotional systems play a critical role in shaping their judgments and 
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and anxiety, stimulates attention, learning, and information seeking, and can inspire a 
reconsideration of partisan loyalties. In contrast, the disposition system, which is related to 
hope and enthusiasm, encourages citizens‟ interest and involvement in the campaign but also 
their reliance on partisanship when voting.
1
 Similarly, risk communication research finds that 
when forming judgments about risks such as climate change, people rely on an “affect 
heuristic,” a processing shortcut via which individuals make decisions based on how they feel 
about an issue. [60]  
 In the specific context of climate change, emotions play an important role in shaping 
risk perceptions and policy support. [9, 61-62] Negative emotions, in particular, may help 
stimulate deeper information processing and thus make people more attentive to risks and to 
the policies that can be used to address them. [28] Fear and anger are related to greater 
support for policies designed to mitigate climate change. [9, 62-63] Among positive 
emotions, hope is strongly associated with support for climate mitigation policies. [9] In turn, 
we expect that hope, anger, and fear will be positively related to support for emissions-
reduction policies that offer a means to resolve the threat of climate change (Hypothesis 6).  
 Political ideology, however, is likely to moderate the effects of emotions on climate 
policy support. Drawing from Affective Intelligence Theory, MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, and 
Marcus [57] argue that discrete emotional reactions to information about a proposed policy 
influence partisans‟ desire for political compromise. In an experimental study, they found that 
fear, because it reduces reliance on habits and facilitates open-mindedness, encourages 
people to adopt conciliatory views; whereas anger, because it signals the desire to confront an 
adversary, results in more entrenched opinions. They found that hope increases individuals‟ 
willingness to compromise, but only when considering a policy that is counter to their 
                                                          
1
 Affective Intelligence Theory identifies enthusiasm as a central emotion of the disposition system. In studies 
based on Affective Intelligence Theory, enthusiasm is measured inconsistently; however, “hope” is almost 
invariably included as an indicator and, in fact, is included more often than “enthusiasm” itself. [e.g., 25, 54-59] 
Thus, it could be argued that the findings from these studies represent the effects of hope as much as, if not more 
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political predispositions. If the policy is consistent with their attitudes, hope limits their 
openness to compromise.  
Some evidence exists for political orientation as a moderator of emotional effects on 
policy in the context of climate change. For example, studies have found that fear, [63] as 
well as the positive emotion of compassion, [64] can encourage opinion moderation among 
conservatives and break through partisan divides on climate change. Anger, on the other 
hand, tends to reinforce existing opinions. [62] Following from this prior research, we 
hypothesize an interaction between emotions and ideology in predicting policy support 
(Hypothesis 7). We expect that anger will reinforce ideologues‟ predispositions toward 
climate policy, leading to greater support among liberals but less support among 
conservatives. In contrast, fear and hope should encourage moderation among conservatives, 
and thus be positively related to policy support for this group. Hope and fear also are likely to 
increase support among liberals, but this relationship may not be as strong as for 
conservatives, given that liberals already are predisposed to support climate policies.  
Finally, we hypothesize indirect effects from the imagery and text manipulations to 
policy support via the discrete emotions of fear, anger, and hope; [26, 30] however, given the 
expected interactions between imagery and ideology, and text and ideology, respectively, in 
predicting emotions and, in turn, between emotions and ideology in predicting policy support, 
the nature of these indirect effects should be conditional on ideology (Hypothesis 8). See 
Table I for a summary of the study‟s hypotheses.  
--Table I here-- 
2. METHOD 
 An online experiment was fielded in May 2015. The study utilized a 5 (type of 
imagery: flood, smokestacks, solar panels, political march, or no image) x 3 (text: impacts 
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experimental news stimulus was embedded within an online survey designed and hosted on 
the Qualtrics platform.  
2.1 Sample 
A sample of 1,575 adults was recruited from a national paid opt-in online survey 
panel through Qualtrics Panels. Qualtrics selects potential study participants from traditional, 
actively managed market research panels, recruited via email sign-up, web banners, social 
media, and invitation only methods. Quotas were used to ensure age, gender, race, and 
ethnicity distributions that approximated census estimates. The sample was 49% female, 72% 
white, and 13% Hispanic, with a mean age of 45.6 (SD = 14.5).  
2.2 Procedure and Stimuli  
After consenting to participate and answering demographic questions, participants 
were randomly assigned to see one of fifteen versions of a news article about climate change 
(i.e., three text conditions crossed with five image conditions; n = 105 per cell). The news 
text discussed U.S.-based impacts and actions in the context of the 2014 National Climate 
Assessment. [65] The text and headline of the article were manipulated to emphasize either 
(1) the impacts of climate change for weather, the economy, public health, and agriculture 
(Headline: “National Climate Assessment Offers Stark Warnings”); (2) possible actions to 
address climate change, including regulating power plant emissions and investing in 
renewable energy sources (Headline: “National Climate Assessment Offers Possibilities for 
Action”); or (3) both impacts and actions (Headline: “National Climate Assessment Offers 
Stark Warnings, Possibilities for Action”). The articles were attributed to The Associated 
Press and formatted to resemble an online news article. All information in the articles was 
factually accurate and adapted from previously published news reports. The impacts only and 
actions only articles were each approximately 190 words; the article that combined 
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The imagery condition was manipulated by embedding one of four color photographs 
in the news article: (1) an aerial view of flood damage in Colorado, (2) smokestacks at a 
Pennsylvania generating station, (3) workers installing solar panels on the roof of a California 
home, or (4) citizens demonstrating in New York City during the 2014 People‟s Climate 
March. The images were domestically focused to increase a sense of local relevance and 
reduce distancing effects by making causes, impacts, and actions more relatable (see [19]). 
Each included a descriptive caption that specified the date and location of the image. A fifth 
of respondents saw only the article text, with no accompanying image.
2
 
Participants were instructed to read the article carefully and told that questions about 
the article would follow. After reading the article, participants completed a survey that 
measured their emotional reactions to the story and climate policy support, among other 
variables.  
Randomization to condition was successful on key demographic variables, including 
age, education, income, gender, race, and ethnicity.  
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Emotions 
Participants indicated how much they had felt each of several emotions while reading 
the news story, on a scale from 1 “not at all” to 7 “very.” Following past research, [66] our 
measure of hope averaged responses for “hopeful,” “optimistic,” and “inspired” (Cronbach‟s 
                                                          
2
 Two questions at the end of the survey gauged, respectively, whether participants (1) remembered and 
interpreted the article text appropriately and (2) recalled the image they were shown. Both questions were 
multiple choice and included an unsure option. The first question asked whether the article discussed the 
impacts of climate change, proposed actions to address climate change, or both. On average, 59% of participants 
answered this question correctly based on the text condition to which they were assigned (to account for the 
possibility that participants may have been factoring the image they saw into their answer, participants also were 
coded as “correct” if they answered “both” and saw an impacts article and actions image or vice versa). The 
second question asked whether the image that appeared in the article depicted workers installing solar roof 
panels, flood damage in Colorado, demonstrators during the People‟s Climate March, smokestacks at a 
generating station, or if the article didn‟t include an image. On average, 78% of participants correctly recalled 
the image. To correct for people who did not accurately recall the stimulus, we re-ran the analysis two ways: (1) 
dropping respondents who did not answer both questions correctly (N = 831) and (2) dropping respondents who 
answered both questions incorrectly (N = 162). In both cases, the pattern of results was largely unchanged from 
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α = .83; M = 4.08, SD = 1.49). Our measure of fear averaged responses for “fearful,” 
“anxious,” and “overwhelmed” (α = .88; M = 3.97, SD = 1.63). Anger was measured with a 
single item, “angry” (M = 3.90, SD = 1.79).  
2.3.2 Support for Climate Mitigation Policies 
Participants indicated their level of support for six policies that have been proposed to 
address climate change: (1) regulating carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as 
pollutants, (2) regulating greenhouse gas emissions from power plants, (3) requiring power 
companies to produce at least 20% of their electricity from wind, solar, or other renewable 
energy sources, (4) increasing government investment in renewable energy industries like 
wind and solar, (5) providing tax rebates for people who purchase energy-efficient vehicles or 
solar panels, and (6) signing an international treaty that requires the US to cut its emissions of 
carbon dioxide by the year 2050. Participants responded from 1 “strongly oppose” to 7 
“strongly support,” with 4 “neither support nor oppose” as the midpoint. Responses to all six 
items were averaged together to create a scale (α = .93; M = 5.59, SD = 1.36). 
2.3.3 Political Ideology 
Participants placed themselves on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 “very liberal” to 7 
“very conservative” (M = 3.99, SD = 1.56). Ideology was not treated as a continuous variable 
because the interactions between the message treatments and ideology were non-linear. Thus, 
political ideology was recoded into a categorical variable, distinguishing between liberals (1 
to 3 on original scale; n = 481, 30.5%), moderates (4 on original scale, n = 609, 38.7%), and 
conservatives (5 to 7 on original scale, n = 485, 30.8%).  
2.3.4 Control Variables 
Because the relationship between emotions and policy support could be subject to 
spuriousness, analyses predicting policy support controlled for age, gender, race, ethnicity, 
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“grade 8 or lower,” 2 = “some high school, no diploma,” 3 = “high school diploma or 
equivalent,” 4 = “technical or vocational school after high school,” 5 = “some college, no 
degree,” 6 = associate degree or 2-year college degree,” 7 = “Bachelor‟s degree,” 8 = 
“Master‟s degree,” 9 = “Professional degree (MD, DDS, LLB, JD, etc.),” and 10 = 
“Doctorate degree (PhD, etc.)” (Mdn = “some college;” M = 5.61, SD = 1.75). Income was 
measured on a 9-point ordinal scale, with each level representing an income range of 
$19,999, anchored by 1 = “less than $20,000” and 9 = “$160,000 or higher” (Mdn = $40,000 
– $59,999; M = 3.33, SD = 1.98).  
The analyses also controlled for ecological beliefs, which are an important predictor 
of climate change attitudes. [67] Ecological beliefs were measured using a seven-item subset 
[68] of the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale. [64] Participants indicated their level 
of agreement with the following statements: (1) “The balance of nature is very delicate and 
easily upset by human activities,” (2) “Ecological, rather than economic, factors must guide 
our use of natural resources,” (3) “We attach too much importance to economic measures of 
the well-being of our society,” (4) “We are approaching the limit of the number of people the 
earth can support,” (5) “When humans interfere with nature, it often produces disastrous 
consequences,” (6) “Humans must live in harmony with nature in order to survive,” and (7) 
“There are limits to growth beyond which our industrialized society cannot expand.” 
Response options ranged from 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree,” with 4 “neither 
agree nor disagree” as the midpoint. Responses were averaged to form a scale (α = .84; M = 
5.20, SD = 1.06).  
3. RESULTS 
 We first test tested the main and interactive effects of the imagery manipulation, text 
manipulation, and ideology on hope, fear, and anger, respectively, using a three-way analysis 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
imagery treatment (F (4, 1526) = 2.59, p < .05, η
2
 = .007), text treatment (F (2, 1526) = 
79.84, p < .001, η
2
 = .09), and ideology (F (2, 1525) = 4.43, p < .05, η
2
 = .006). Table II 
displays the cell means across the imagery and text conditions. For the main effect of 
imagery, planned contrasts comparing mean levels of hope in each image condition to the no 
image condition indicated that only the solar image was significantly different from no image 
(t (1526) = 2.1, p < .05). Post-hoc tests of the estimated marginal means using the Šidák 
correction also showed significant differences between the solar and flood conditions (t 
(1525) = 3.1, p < .05). For the main effect of the text treatment, planned contrasts indicated 
that hope was significantly higher in the actions only condition (t (1526) = 12.5, p < .001) and 
in the impacts plus actions condition (t (1526) = 5.3, p < .001) relative to the impacts only 
condition. This effect, however, was moderated by ideology (F (4, 1526) = 3.42, p < .01, η
2
 = 
.009; see Figure 1). As predicted, the simple effect of the text treatment among conservatives 
was smaller (F (2, 1526) = 10.3, p < .001, η
2
 = .01) than it was for liberals (F (2, 1526) = 
44.0, p < .001, η
2
 = .05) and moderates (F (2, 1526) = 32.5, p < .001, η
2
 = .04). Among 
conservatives, the difference between the actions only and impacts only conditions was 
significant (t (1526) = 4.5, p < .001) but not the difference between the impacts only and 
impacts plus actions conditions. For liberals and moderates, both pairwise differences were 
significant (liberals: actions only vs. impacts only, t (1526) = 9.4, p < .001, impacts plus 
actions vs. impacts only, t (1526) = 4.7, p < .001; moderates: actions only vs. impacts only, t 
(1526) = 8.0, p < .001, impacts plus actions vs. impacts only, t (1526) = 2.9, p < .05). No 
other interactions were significant. 
--Table II and Figure 1 here-- 
 Turning to fear, the ANOVA results showed a non-significant main effect of the 
imagery treatment (F (4, 1525) = 1.78, p = .13); however, the main effects of the text 
treatment (F (2, 1525) = 74.23, p < .001, η
2








 = .06) were significant. For the main effect of the text treatment, planned contrasts 
indicated that fear was significantly lower in the actions only condition (t (1525) = 11.4; p < 
.001) and in the impacts plus actions condition (t (1525) = 2.9; p < .01) relative to the impacts 
only condition. Text and ideology interacted (F (4, 1525) = 3.26, p < .05, η
2
 = .008; see 
Figure 2), such that the simple effect of the text treatment for liberals was larger (F (2, 1525) 
= 44.1, p < .001, η
2
 = .05) than for moderates (F (2, 1525) = 16.9, p < .001, η
2
 = .02) and 
conservatives (F (2, 1525) = 16.7, p < .001, η
2
 = .02). For all three groups, the difference 
between the impacts only and actions only conditions was significant (liberals: t (1525) = 8.6, 
p < .001; moderates: t (1525) = 5.5, p < .001; conservatives t (1525) = 5.7, p < .001), whereas 
the difference between the impacts only and impacts plus actions conditions was not 
significant. No other interactions were significant. 
-- Figure 2 here -- 
 The ANOVA results for anger revealed significant main effects of the imagery 
treatment (F (4, 1525) = 3.10, p < .05, η
2
 = .008), text treatment (F (2, 1525) = 64.08, p < 
.001, η
2
 = .08), and ideology (F (2, 1525) = 15.55, p < .001, η
2
 = .02). For the main effect of 
imagery, none of the planned contrasts between the image and no image conditions were 
significant. However, post-hoc tests using the Šidák correction showed differences between 
the flood and both the solar (t (1525) = 2.9; p < .05) and march conditions (t (1525) = 3.0; p < 
.05). For the main effect of the text treatment, planned contrasts indicated that anger was 
significantly lower in the actions only condition than in the impacts only condition (t (1525) 
= 10.3; p < .001); the difference between the impacts plus actions and the impacts only 
conditions was not significant. As with fear, the interaction between text and ideology was 
significant (F (4, 1525) = 3.89, p < .01, η
2
 = .01; see Figure 3), such that the simple effect of 
the text treatment among liberals was larger (F (2, 1525) = 42.9, p < .001, η
2
 = .05) than it 
was for moderates (F (2, 1525) = 15.9, p < .001, η
2
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10.7, p < .001, η
2
 = .01). For all three groups, the difference between the impacts only and 
actions only conditions was significant (liberals: t (1525) = 8.3, p < .001; moderates: t (1525) 
= 4.9, p < .001; conservatives t (1525) = 4.4, p < .001), whereas the difference between the 
impacts only and impacts plus actions conditions was not significant.  No other interactions 
were significant. 
 Based on these results, H1 received only limited support; H2 was supported (with the 
exception of the non-significant difference between actions plus impacts and impacts only for 
anger), H3 was not supported, H4 was partially supported, and H5 was not supported (see 
Table I). Also, although not hypothesized, we examined the direct treatment effects on policy 
support; neither the main nor interactive effects were significant.  
--Figure 3 here-- 
 Next, to test the direct effects of emotions on policy support and the indirect effects of 
the imagery and text manipulations on policy support via emotions, both conditional on 
ideology, we used the SPSS PROCESS macro. [69] PROCESS provides OLS regression 
coefficients as well as bootstrapped confidence intervals for the indirect effects. As a test of 
mediation, bootstrap methods, which do not assume normality, are considered superior to 
alternatives such as the Sobel test or causal steps approach. [69] The bootstrap analysis was 
conducted with 10,000 iterations and bias-corrected estimates. Because the ANOVAs 
revealed a significant interaction between the text treatment and political ideology on 
emotions, we accounted for this interaction in our model, along with the proposed 
interactions between emotions (mean-centered) and ideology on policy support. Because 
there were no interactions involving the imagery treatment, we did not model any additional 
interaction terms. The indirect effects of the text treatment were tested using PROCESS 
Model 76; the indirect effects of the imagery treatment, which did not include interactions 
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ideology entered as covariates. The no imagery and impacts only text conditions served as the 
respective reference categories in the analyses.
3
  
Table III reports the OLS regression results predicting the emotion mediators (hope, 
fear, and anger) from the treatment conditions and control variables, and predicting policy 
support from the treatment conditions, mediators, and control variables. The regression 
results predicting each of the emotions (columns 1-3) are consistent with the ANOVA results 
discussed previously, and thus are not elaborated further in the text. Looking to the impact of 
emotions on policy support (column 4), hope and fear are both positively related to support 
for climate mitigation policies, whereas anger is negatively related. The results for hope and 
fear are consistent with H6; the results for anger are not. However, as predicted by H7, there 
are significant interactions between the emotion variables and ideology. Using PROCESS, 
we probed the interactions to determine the direct effect of each emotion on policy support 
for each ideological group. Hope is positively related to policy support among moderates (B 
= .12, SE = .03, p < .001) and especially conservatives (B = .20, SE = .03, p < .001); this 
relationship is not quite significant for liberals (B = .06, SE = .03, p = .06) (see Figure 4). The 
positive association between fear and policy support is significant for conservatives (B = .35, 
SE = .03, p < .001) and moderates (B = .08, SE = .03, p < .05) but not liberals (B = .006, SE = 
.04, p = .88) (see Figure 5). The relationship between anger and policy support is negative 
and significant for conservatives (B = -.08, SE = .03, p < .01), whereas it is positive and 
significant for moderates (B = .06, SE = .03, p < .05) and positive but non-significant for 
liberals (B = .05, SE = .03, p = .12) (see Figure 6). These patterns are generally consistent 
with H7, such that the positive relationships between fear and hope, respectively, and policy 
                                                          
3
 In the regression model predicting policy support, we detected some mild non-linearity and heteroscedasticity. 
We experimented with several different approaches to minimize these violations (i.e., transformations of the 
dependent variable, deletion of multivariate outliers, robust standard errors). In no case did these data 
modifications meaningfully change the results; thus, it seems that our results are robust to violations of 
regression assumptions. Still, Huber-White standard errors, which do not assume homoscedasticity, are reported 
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support are largest among conservatives, whereby anger has a divergent relationship with 
policy support among liberals (positive) and conservatives (negative).  
--Table III and Figures 4-6 here-- 
Turning to the conditional indirect effects of the imagery conditions on policy support 
via the emotion mediators, the solar condition had small but significant indirect effects, via 
hope, on policy support for liberals (B = .01, SE = .01, LCI = .001, UCI = .039), moderates (B 
= .03, SE = .01, LCI = .003, UCI = .064), and conservatives (B = .05, SE = .02, LCI = .006, 
UCI = .104). Thus, exposure to the solar image, as compared to no image, indirectly 
increased policy support through its effect on hope for all ideological groups. None of the 
other imagery conditions exerted significant indirect effects on policy support through 
emotions for any ideological group.  
 Table IV reports the bootstrapped indirect effects of the text conditions on policy 
support via hope, fear, and anger across ideological groups. Among liberals, moderates, and 
conservatives, both the impacts plus actions and the actions only conditions had significant, 
positive indirect effects on policy support via hope. The actions only condition significantly 
decreased policy support via fear for moderates and especially conservatives; this effect was 
not significant for liberals. The actions only condition also indirectly decreased policy 
support via anger for liberals and moderates, although this effect was significant only for 
liberals; in contrast, the indirect effect through anger for conservatives was positive and 
significant. There were no other significant indirect effects of the text manipulation. Thus, H8 
was only partially supported. 
--Table IV here-- 
4. DISCUSSION 
The results of the present experimental study suggest that including climate imagery 
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hope relative to no image. When compared to no image, no other effects of the image 
manipulation on hope, fear, or anger were significant. It is unclear why the images did not 
have a more powerful effect on emotions, as predicted. It may be that any effects of the 
images were overwhelmed by the article text [48] and, in particular, by the article headlines, 
which participants may have read before processing the image. [70] Still, it is notable that the 
flood and smokestack imagery, which prior studies have found to be especially salience 
inducing, [38] had no emotional effects here. This may be because, as suggested by previous 
research, [29] the presence of text dampens negative emotional reactions to disaster imagery 
through its emphasis on reasoning and logic. In any case, the results suggest that visuals do 
not uniformly evoke emotions and that certain images in certain contexts may lack emotional 
resonance (also see [41]). Importantly, the solar image – which was the one image to 
significantly affect emotions by boosting hope – offers the clearest option for individual 
action in response to climate change; this contrasts with political protest – the other action 
image we studied – whose success relies on others‟ participation and on the responsiveness of 
government. Of the images used in this study, images of solar panels are least likely to appear 
in news coverage of climate change. [17] The image‟s relative novelty in the media 
landscape, along with its focus on individual action, may have contributed to its unique 
effects. Ultimately, however, we cannot confirm the precise mechanism underlying the solar 
image‟s effect on hope, and this remains an important question for future studies.  
In contrast to the imagery manipulation, the text manipulation had consistent, 
significant effects on emotions. Specifically, the inclusion of information about actions in a 
news story –both alone and in combination with information about impacts – increased hope, 
while decreasing fear, relative to a story that only discussed climate impacts. When a news 
story discussed actions alone, this also decreased anger relative to a story that only discussed 
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no different than when only including impacts. These results align with prior research that 
has found that including information about actions and their likely effectiveness, or efficacy, 
can increase hope [8, 25] and decrease fear. [8] Notably, the textual effects observed in the 
present study, while weakest for conservatives, remained significant regardless of political 
ideology. Moreover, the imagery effects were uniform across ideological groups. As 
Gadarian [53] found, images often retain their potency across the political divide as long as 
they are not sponsored by a partisan group. Overall, these findings suggest that the efficacy 
cues embedded in action-oriented texts and images help to minimize motivated reasoning and 
could be a promising strategy for reaching those who tend to be more dismissive toward 
climate change. 
Contrary to expectations, the text and imagery manipulations did not interact in their 
effects on emotions. This diverges from previous research that found that congruency 
between visual and textual information enhances message effects; [45-46] however, it is 
consistent with one recent study that found that the effects of news images and texts were not 
conditional on one another. [42] Given these discrepant findings, this remains an important 
area for future research. 
Some of the most interesting results from the study concern the relationships between 
emotions and support for climate mitigation policies. Here, we found interactions consistent 
with MacKuen et al.‟s [57] argument that fear motivates compromise among political 
ideologues, thereby encouraging opinion moderation, whereas anger is likely to discourage 
compromise and instead reinforce existing views. According to MacKuen et al., hope will 
inspire political compromise only when ideologues are confronted with policies that are 
counter to their political predispositions. When applying MacKuen et al.‟s theory to public 
opinion about environmental risk policy, our results showed that fear indeed encouraged 
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support for such policies, although fear had no effect on liberals. In contrast, anger appeared 
to reinforce existing predispositions by decreasing policy support among conservatives while 
increasing support among liberals (although the latter trend was not significant, likely due to 
ceiling effects). Finally, hope was positively associated with policy support among all 
ideological groups, although this effect was significant only for conservatives and moderates. 
This suggests that conservatives, when feeling hopeful, are willing to moderate their opinions 
by increasing their support for policies that they otherwise may be reticent to accept. Liberals, 
when feeling hopeful, do not moderate their opinions toward an ideologically consistent set 
of policies, but rather exhibit a trend of stronger support. Overall, high levels of anger 
produced the greatest polarization in public opinion between liberals and conservatives, 
whereas fear resulted in the least. These results suggest that emotions play a nuanced role in 
driving public opinion on divisive risk mitigation policies and that messages that evoke fear, 
and to a lesser extent hope, may offer the most promising routes to decreasing ideological 
polarization in public support for such policies. 
Given the relationships between the experimental manipulations and emotions and, in 
turn, between emotions and policy support, we also found evidence for indirect effects of the 
news treatments on policy support via hope, fear, and anger. The solar panel image, as well as 
news texts that emphasized actions alone or both impacts and actions, indirectly increased 
policy support via hope across ideological groups. News texts that discussed actions alone 
decreased policy support, via fear, among moderates and conservatives. Through the 
mediator of anger, news texts that discussed actions alone indirectly decreased policy support 
among liberals while increasing policy support among conservatives.  
Taken together, these results continue to support an important role for hope – which is 
enhanced in response to news stories that emphasize actions to address climate change – as a 
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induced hope to climate activism; [8] this study extends this relationship to policy attitudes. 
The results also suggest that there is a risk inherent in emphasizing climate solutions: 
Although doing so increases hope, it also reduces fear, which we find is an important booster 
of policy support, particularly among conservatives. While some warn that fear can be 
counter-productive for public engagement with climate change, [9, 19, 71] this study suggests 
that fear is not only important for climate policy support but also encourages opinion 
moderation among political ideologues, especially conservatives. Thus, fear appeals – at least 
when balanced with information about actions and their efficacy – should be reconsidered as 
a climate communication strategy (see [28]). In particular, it is important for future research 
to consider how action-oriented information about climate change can be presented in such a 
way as to increase hope but not reduce fear. Combining impacts and actions information, 
rather than focusing on actions exclusively, may be one approach. [11-12] In fact, the actions 
plus impacts text condition did not have any significant negative indirect effects via fear, only 
positive effects through hope. Also, images may be a more straightforward way to indirectly 
boost policy support, since they did not affect fear – although the imagery effects overall 
were small.  
While the results from this study have important theoretical and practical 
implications, there are limitations that should be kept in mind. Most significantly, a single 
image was used to represent each image type; it is possible that the particular images selected 
as well as characteristics unique to the selected images – such as their vividness or colors – 
influenced the pattern of effects. Thus, generalizing beyond the effects of the specific images 
tested here should be done cautiously. Ideally, future studies will attempt to replicate and 
build on these results using a more diverse set of images. Also, political protest was not 
mentioned explicitly in the news story as a potential action to address climate change; this 
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were more directly connected to information presented in the news text. The image captions – 
which were included to increase the ecological validity of the news articles – may have 
attenuated the emotional effects of the imagery, although Pfau et al. [29] found that a news 
image with a brief caption was more emotionally evocative than an image with full news text; 
thus, if anything, the story text is more likely than the captions to have weakened the 
emotional impacts of the images. Still, testing imagery effects, independent of the captions, 
remains an important direction for future research. In addition, it is important to note that the 
captions indicated a particular location; examining place as a moderator of the effects seen 
here represents another useful research avenue.  
Several limitations involve our emotions measures. First, anger was measured with a 
single item rather than a multi-item scale, which may have reduced reliability and made it 
more difficult to detect effects on anger. Second, by not measuring positive emotions beyond 
hope, it is unclear whether the effects for hope are attributable to hope specifically or to 
positive affect more broadly; this is an important question for future research. Third, 
emotions were measured via self-report, rather than direct physiological measures, and with 
respect to the news article in general. It is thus difficult to know what specifically about the 
text or image content triggered certain emotions and how this may vary across treatments 
and/or individual predispositions, as well as whether different emotional referents affect 
policy support differently. For example, liberals‟ anger may have been triggered by the 
perceived injustice of climate change, whereas conservatives‟ anger may have been driven by 
reactance to the message. [72] In addition, we don‟t know the order in which participants 
processed the text and imagery in the stories and how the order of information processing 
affected the results; eye-tracking could be used in future research to capture this, as could 
experimentally manipulating the order or positioning of information. Relatedly, the findings 
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determined by the producer. Finally, we should note that the effect sizes observed in this 
study were small to moderate. In future research, it will be important to study the effects of 
repeated exposure to climate change messages, as well as test how the effects observed here 
either may intensify or subside over time. It also is important to consider the present results 
alongside other studies that analyze influences on different perceptual, attitudinal, or 
behavioral outcomes. [73] 
In conclusion, this study‟s results hold promise for engaging the public more broadly 
around the risk of climate change. Public support for climate mitigation policies places 
critical pressure on elected officials and may help push the needle toward effective 
implementation of new regulations and incentives to stimulate clean energy development and 
reduce fossil fuel use. The results suggest that text and imagery that emphasize actions that 
can be taken to address climate change inspire hope, which, in turn, increases climate policy 
support across the ideological spectrum. Given that news stories often do not discuss the 
actions that can be taken to minimize the negative impacts of climate change and, in 
particular, often neglect individual behaviors, [11] and news imagery typically focuses on 
threatening landscapes and distancing visuals rather than climate solutions, [17] we hope that 
these results can help journalists better understand how their reporting and editorial choices 
may influence public involvement with climate change, while also informing more effective 
risk communication practice.  
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Table I. Summary of predicted effects 
  Outcome Variable 
Hypothesis Predictor Hope Fear Anger Policy Support 
H1 Imagery 
A
     
 Flood - + + n/a 
 Smokestacks - + + n/a 
 March + - - n/a 
 Solar + - - n/a 
H2 Text 
B
     
 Actions Only + - - n/a 
 Actions + Impacts + - - n/a 
H3 Text x Imagery Predicted text effects on 
emotions should be stronger 
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weaker when image is 
incongruent 
H4 Text x Ideology Predicted text effects on 
emotions should be weaker 
among conservatives than 
among liberals and moderates 
n/a 
H5 Imagery x Ideology Predicted imagery effects on 
emotions should be weaker 
among conservatives than 
among liberals and moderates  
n/a 
H6 Emotions     
 Hope n/a n/a n/a + 
 Fear n/a n/a n/a + 
 Anger n/a n/a n/a + 
H7 Emotions x Ideology     
 Hope x Ideology n/a n/a n/a + among all groups, 
but strongest among 
conservatives 
 Fear x Ideology n/a n/a n/a + among all groups, 
but strongest among 
conservatives 
 Anger x Ideology n/a n/a n/a + among liberals, - 
among conservatives 
H8 Conditional Indirect 
Effects 
Indirect effects of the imagery and text manipulations 
on policy support are predicted via fear, anger, and 
hope, and these effects will be conditional on ideology 
Note. - indicates a negative predicted effect. + indicates a positive predicted effect.  
A 
The direction of the imagery effects are predicted compared to the No Image condition.  
B 
The direction of the text effects are predicted compared to the Impacts Only condition. 
 
 
Table II. Adjusted Marginal Means for Emotion Variables Across Image and Text 
Conditions  
 Imagery condition 
Text condition 
No image Flood Smoke-
stacks 
March Solar Total 
Hope       
Impacts Only 3.47 (.14) 3.42 (.14) 3.53 (.14) 3.54 (.14) 3.78 (.14) 3.55 (.06) 
Impacts + Actions 4.01 (.14) 3.90 (.14) 4.02 (.14) 4.03 (.14) 4.15 (.14) 4.02 (.06) 
Actions Only  4.65 (.14) 4.46 (.14) 4.75 (.14) 4.55(.14) 4.92 (.14) 4.66 (.06) 
Total  4.04 (.08) 3.93 (.08) 4.10 (.08) 4.04(.08) 4.28 (.08) 4.08 (.04) 
Fear       
Impacts Only 4.60 (.15) 4.36 (.15) 4.47 (.15) 4.39 (.15) 4.31 (.15) 4.42 (.07) 
Impacts + Actions 4.40 (.15) 4.39 (.15) 4.12 (.15) 4.01 (.15) 4.15 (.15) 4.14 (.07) 
Actions Only  3.50 (.15) 3.48 (.15) 3.37 (.15) 3.00 (.15) 3.18 (.15) 3.31 (.07) 
Total  4.05 (.09) 4.08 (.09) 3.98 (.09) 3.80 (.09) 3.88 (.09) 3.96 (.04) 
Anger       
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Impacts + Actions 4.09 (.17) 4.39 (.17) 4.26 (.17) 4.01 (.17) 4.18 (.17) 4.19 (.08) 
Actions Only  3.23 (.17) 3.52 (.17) 3.25 (.17) 3.01 (.17) 2.99 (.17) 3.20 (.08) 
Total  3.90 (.10) 4.14 (.10) 3.96 (.10) 3.73 (.10) 3.74 (.10) 3.89 (.04) 
*Note. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Table III. OLS Regression Results Predicting Emotions and Policy Support  
 Hope  Fear Anger Policy Support 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Conceptual Variables     
Imagery Treatment 
A
     
Flood -0.06 (.11) 0.06 (.11) 0.25 (.13) 0.08 (.07) 
Smokestacks 0.06 (.11) -0.09 (.11) 0.05 (.13) 0.0002 (.07) 
March 0.04 (.11) -0.16 (.11) -0.11 (.13) 0.05 (.07) 
Solar 0.24 (.11)* -0.16 (.11) -0.16 (.13) 0.06 (.07) 
Text Treatment 
B
     
Impacts + Actions 0.31 (.16)* -0.29 (.17) -0.17 (.20) -0.05 (.13) 









     
Liberals -0.39 (.16)* 0.69 
(.16)*** 
0.61 (.18)** 0.59 (.11)*** 
Moderates -0.05 (.15) 0.30 (.16) 0.17 (.18) 0.28 (.11)* 
Text x Ideology 
Interactions  
    
Impacts/Actions x 
Liberal 
0.44 (.22)*  -0.04 (.21) 0.04 (.25) 0.13 (.15) 
Impacts/Actions x 
Moderate 
0.07 (.21) 0.11 (.22) 0.16 (.25) 0.002 (.15) 
Actions Only x Liberal 0.79 
(.22)*** 
-0.67 (.23)** -0.83 (.27)** -0.19 (.18) 
Actions Only x 
Moderate 
0.41 (.21) 0.18 (.21) 0.04 (.25) -0.17 (.18) 
Emotions (mean-centered)     
Hope -- -- -- 0.20 (.04)*** 
Fear -- -- -- 0.35 (.05)*** 
Anger -- -- -- -0.08 (.04)* 
Emotion x Ideology 
Interactions 
    
Hope x Liberal -- -- -- -0.15 (.04)** 
Hope x Moderate -- -- -- -0.09 (.05) 
Fear x Liberal -- -- -- -0.35 (.06)*** 
Fear x Moderate -- -- -- -0.27 (.06)*** 
Anger x Liberal -- -- -- 0.13 (.05)** 
Anger x Moderate -- -- -- 0.14 (.05)** 





0.006 (.003)* -0.007 
(.002)*** 
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Race (white) -0.24 
(.08)** 
-.12 (.08) 0.04 (.10) -0.13 (.05)* 
Ethnicity (Hispanic)  0.27 (.11)* .37 (.11)*** 0.26 (.12)* -0.02 (.07) 
Education -0.04 (.02) -.01 (.02) 0.002 (.02) 0.01 (.01) 
Income 0.007 (.02) .03 (.02) 0.03 (.02) -0.01 (.01) 









1.47 (.35)*** 2.37 (.21)*** 
R
2
 .16 .28 .17 .57 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients and Huber-White standard errors are reported. N 
= 1568. 
A 
No image is the reference category. 
B
 Impacts Only is the reference category. 
C
 Conservative ideology is the reference category. 
*** 
p < .001; 
** 
p < .01; 
*
p < .05.  
 
Table IV. Conditional Indirect Effects of Text Conditions on Policy Support 
Via Emotional Mediators across Levels of Political Ideology  




















Hope Liberal  .04 (.02) .009, 
.090 
 .09 (.04) .016, 
.167 
 Moderate .04 (.02) .015, 
.096 
 .13 (.04) .070, 
.216 
 Conservative .06 (.03) .005, 
.143 
 .15 (.04) .074, 
.246 
Fear Liberal  -.002 (.01) -.031, 
.019 
 -.01 (.06) -.124, 
.099 
 Moderate -.01 (.01) -.053, 
.003 
 -.07 (.03) -.140, -
.015 
 Conservative -.10 (.06) -.230, 
.014 
 -.34 (.08) -.512, -
.208 
Anger Liberal  -.007 (.01) -.036, 
.008 
 -.09 (.04) -.181, -
.004 
 Moderate -.0005 (.01) -.024, 
.019 
 -.05 (.03) -.110, 
.0008 
 Conservative .01 (.02) -.011, 
.071 
 .07 (.04) .003, 
.164 
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors and confidence intervals were computed 
using 10,000 bootstrap samples. Bold text is used to denote significant effects, 
p < .05. 
A
 Relative to the Impacts Only condition 










Figure 1. Mean levels of hope across text conditions and ideological groups with 95% CIs 
 
 







































This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean levels of anger across text conditions and ideological groups with 95% CIs 
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Figure 5. Predicted values of policy support as a function of fear and ideology with 95% CIs 
 
Figure 6. Predicted values of policy support as a function of anger and ideology with 95% 
CIs 
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